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IN THE SUPRErvlE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.1.\ Y:\' E \\YETI-IEitELL CH.ASE, 
Plain tiff-Appellant~ 
vs. 
I•: I>\\' l X "\~lOS Cllr\SE, JR., 
Defendant-ll es pond ent. 
Case No. 
9919 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE"'IENT OF 'THE CASE 
The defendant, haYing been divorced by plaintiff 
in 1961. sought by this action to have the decree of 
divorce nwdified to award custody of a Ininor child of 
the marriage to him. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LO,VER COURT 
At a hearing held on )lay 6, 1963, pursuant to 
tlefendant's order to show cause, the District Court of 
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the Fifth Judicial District, Hon. C. Nelson Day pre-
siding, found that the child's welfare and interest would 
best be served by awarding custody to defendant and 
ordered that custody of the child be accordingly awarded 
to defendant subject to plaintiff's right of reasonable 
visitation and terminated the requirement that defendant 
pay child support. ( R. 29-30). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Nephi, 
Utah, on August 29, 1958. (R. 16, 27). A child, Robert 
Leon Chase, was born to the marriage on October 10, 
1960. (R. 16, 27). 
On March 11, 1961, the District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District, Hon. Will L. Hoyt presiding, en-
tered a Judgment and decree of divorce which, among 
other things, awarded plaintiff a divorce from defend-
ant; awarded custody of the boy, Robert Leon Chase, 
to plaintiff and required defendant to pay $1.00 per 
month alimony and $60.00 per month child support to 
plaintiff. (R. 14, 15, 27). 
About the first of March, 1961, plaintiff moved 
from Nephi to Salt Lake City, Utah, leaving the boy 
with her parents, the boy's maternal grandparents, and 
from that time to the date of the hearing in question, 
with the exception of one week in the first part of No-
veinber, 1962, plaintiff has lived in Salt Lake City and 
the boy has remained with her parents in Nephi. ( Tr. 
56-60). 
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From the tin1e plaintiff moved to Salt Lake City. 
she has been regularly employed and at the time of the 
henring was earning in the neighborhood of $390.00 per 
month. ( Tr. 56). 
On .July :!H, 1962, the plaintiff married Harry F. 
Ilam's, to whmn she was still married at the date of the 
hearing, ( 'l'r. ;)..J.-55) and about October 1, 1962, moved 
into the home where they resided at the date of the 
hearing. ( Tr. 55). Plaintiff's present husband is an in-
surance salesman and earns in excess of $500.00 per 
month. ( Tr. 56). Plaintiff and her husband live in a 
two-bedroom duplex apartment in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 
:w). 
From the date of the divorce, defendant has lived 
in Xephi and has worked as a cook in a local cafe, where 
he now holds the position of chef, supervising the em-
ployment of several employees. (Tr. 5, 11, 44). His 
salary at the time of the hearing was $500.00 per month 
before deductions. ( Tr. 6). His employer testified 
that he expects to expand his operations and to elevate 
defendant to a position of greater responsibility in his 
organization. ( Tr. 45, 46). 
Defendant retnarried on June 26, 1961, and lives 
with his present wife and eight month old (at the time 
of the hearing) daughter in a two bedroom duplex 
in Xephi. (Tr. 5, 9-10). Defendant's wife is not work-
mg. 
Defendant has n1ade all alimony payments regu-
larly and on ti1ne and has visited with the boy and has 
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had him in his home three or four times per week since 
the original divorce. (Tr. 4, 7-8, 37). 
There is some discrepancy in the record with regard 
to the frequency of plaintiff's visits. Plaintiff testified 
that she visited her son in Nephi every weekend and 
stayed from Friday night to Sunday. (Tr. 57). Plain-
tiff's husband testified that they visited "at least every 
other week.'' (Tr. 66). 
Both plaintiff and her husband work full-time. 
Plaintiff testified that she planned to continue working 
until their furniture and two 1963 cars were paid off, 
that is, until October, 1963, (Tr. 56-57) and that as 
soon as they were paid off~ she would " ... quit work 
and bring Robbie up with me." (Tr. 56). Plaintiff 
also testified that she had originally planned to place 
the boy in a nursery school until that time but later 
changed her mind and decided to leave the child in Nephi 
because she "didn't want to fight with them." (Tr. 60). 
Plaintiff also testified that she can quit work if neces-
sary. (Tr. 58). 
On one occasion, about the first of November, 
1962, plaintiff, over the objections of defendant and 
plaintiff's parents, removed the child from the care of 
her parents and took him to Salt Lake City. Two days 
after making the change, she placed him in a day nur-
sery where he spent the following five days, during the 
hours from 8 :00 a.m. to 5 :30 p.m., until plaintiff's 
1nother came to Salt Lake City from Nephi and pre-
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,·ailed upon plaintiff to allow her to take the child back 
to ~ephi with her. (Tr. 19, :!a-:n. 58-61). 
Plaintiff testified that during the pendency of the 
divon·e proceedings she was earning $200.00 per month 
working for her father. (Tr. 63-64). In addition, 
plnintitl"s counsel elicited testimony to the effect that 
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce the Court 
otfered plaintiff $170.00 per month alimony and child 
support if she would stay with the child, which she re-
t'usnl. ( Tr. L>. 21; R. 10). 
The boy is physically and mentally healthy, (Tr. 
71) although an impending discipline problem was men-
tioned at various stages of the testimony. ( Tr. 13, 39, 
6ti-ti7, 68-70). 
Both couples are In their early twenties and are 
physically and mentally fit. Both couples are financially 
able to provide for themselves and for the child. Plain-
till' (Tr. 58, 60) and her husband (Tr. 65) and de-
fendant ( Tr. 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24) and his wife 
( Tr. :37-39) have all expressed a love for the boy and 
a desire to have hi1n live in their respective homes. There 
is no real showing that either of the parties are morally 
unfit or that the family groups into which they propose 
to place the boy would have a negative moral influence 
on him. 
After finding that plaintiff had "evidenced not an 
entire lack of attention, but certainly not what would 
he expected of a mother who was greatly concerned 
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about her child ... " ( R. 29), the trial court held that 
the child" .. would be better off by having a more stable 
home environment and the care and attention of parents 
who love and care for him in their home." (R. 29), 
and ordered that custody of the child be awarded to 
defendant subject to the plaintiff's right of reasonable 
visitation and accordingly discontinued the requirement 
that defendant pay child support payments to the plain-
tiff. ( R. 29-30) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION 
OF ISSUES OF FACT SHOULD NOT BE DIS-
TURBED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING OF 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
This court has repeatedly held that it would not 
disturb a trial court's judgment with regard to findings 
in matters in equity on appeal unless it appears 
to be unjust, inequitable, and contrary to the evidence 
and therefore an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. John-
son, 7 Ut. ( 2d) 263, 323 P. ( 2d) 16. In that case this 
court said: 
"Due to the equitable nature of such proceed-
ings, the proper adjudication of which is highly 
dependent upon personal equations which the 
trial court is in an advantaged position to ap-
praise, he is allowed considerable latitude of dis-
cretion and his orders will not be disturbed unless 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it appears that there has been a plain abuse there-
of." 
In the recent ease of Wilson, et u,r. v. Pierce~ 14 Ut. 
(~d) ....• 383 P.(:!d) 925, handed down this year, this 
court stated that: 
''Beeause of his close contact with the parties 
and the opportunity it affords him [the trial 
eourt) to form a judgment not only of their 
veracity, but of their qualities of character and 
sincerity of purpose, which are particularly im-
portant factors in proceedings of this kind, we 
1nake due allowance for his advantaged position; 
and in accord with the traditional rule, review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the find-
ings and decree; and will not disturb them unless 
it is shown to clearly preponderate to the con-
trary. Nokes v. Continental Min. Co., 6 Ut. 
(2d) 177, 308 P. (2d) 954." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND 
Tl-IAT THE BEST INTEREST AND WEL-
FARE OF THE MINOR CHILD WOULD 
BEST BE SERVED BY A 'V ARDING CUS-
TODlr OF SAID CHILD TO HIS FATHER. 
The record and transcript disclose a marked simi-
larity in a great many of the qualifications presented 
by both parties in their suit to gain the custody of the 
boy. Both parties ha Ye remarried and are establishing 
homes in houses suitable for the rearing of a small boy. 
Both couples are young, physically and mentally fit 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and are financially able to provide for the1nselves and 
the boy. Although there is some evidence disparaging 
the moral fitness of the parties, it is submitted that there 
is not and cannot be serious dispute with the proposition 
that neither party would, if given the opportunity, 
expose the child to adverse moral influences. As the 
court said in UTilson~ et 1w:. v. Pierce~ supra: 
"As is quite usual in these cases, the contend· 
ing parties sought to disparage each other as 
unfit to rear this child. While there was some 
evidence in support of their respective accusa-
tions, it must be appraised in the light of the 
facts that the parties felt obliged to engage in 
such recriminations; and that we are not dealing 
with angels, but with human beings who are 
prone to frailty. In spite of these efforts to show 
to the contrary, we say advisedly that there was 
nothing brought out by either party to create 
any real concern that the other was actually unfit 
to have the child's custody." 
The only real disparity in the qualifications of 
the contending parties manifests itself in a comparison 
of the parties' respective capacities to give the necessary 
love and personal attention to the child. 
The evidence on one hand shows that plaintiff could 
have remained in Nephi, financially comfortable, and 
kept the child with her and thereby afforded herself 
an opportunity to give such personal attention and love 
and affection to the boy. Instead, for reasons personal 
to herself, she chose to leave the child in the care of her 
parents in Nephi and move to Salt Lake City. In addi-
10 
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t ion. nt'ter she had retnarried and moved to a home 
which she testified was suitable and large enough for the 
l·hild and with an income large enough so that it was 
not necessary that she work, she still put off bringing 
the <.'hild to live with her until she had accomplished 
other objediYes which apparently seemed more impor-
tant to her. such as paying off two 1963 automobiles 
nnd cmnpleting paytnent on household furnishings and 
other personal possessions. And when she did bring the 
child to Salt Lake City she did not give him her personal 
attention, love and support during the difficult time 
of adjusting to a new family and surroundings, but 
instead placed him in a day nursery where he spent 
virtually all of his waking hours until his grandmother 
rescued him one week later. 
On the other hand, the evidence shows that the 
defendant has taken every opportunity to be with the 
boy and on such occasions spent considerable time with 
him and has given him a great deal of attention and has 
amply demonstrated his love to the boy. Also, it is 
,·ery significant to note that the defendant's present 
wife has wholeheartedly joined in these occasions and 
has also made a separate and substantial effort to give 
the boy the love of a mother which he had theretofore 
missed and has expended considerable effort in taking 
the boy on excursions and in making clothes and other 
gifts for hin1. ~--\.ccordingly, the trial court found that 
the child·s interest would best be served and the child's 
welfare best promoted if the custody of the child was 
placed in the fatnily where he would be assured of re-
11 
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ceiving the love and attention which he needs. The trial 
court's fiindings should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE CONTROLLING OBJECTIYE IN 
AWARDING CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD 
OF DIVORCED PARENTS IS THE PRO~IO­
TION OF THE BEST INTEREST AND WEL-
FARE OF THE CHILD. 
The authority in support of this proposition is so 
overwhelming that respondent makes no argument ex-
cept to cite the following leading and recent cases: 
McBroom v. McBroom~ 14 Ut. (2d) .... , ____ P. (2d) 
____ , (handed down in August, 1963); Wilson~ et ux. v. 
Pierce~ supra; Johnson v. Johnson~ supra; Steiger v. 
Seiger~ 4 Ut. (2d) 273, 293 P. (2d) 418, 420; Walton 
v. Coffman et ux.~ 110 Utah 1, 169 P. (2d) 97; Sees. 
30-3-5 and 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF HAD NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT 
TO THE CUSTODY OF HER MINOR CHILD 
MERELY BECAUSE THERE "\iV AS NO FIND-
ING THAT SHE 'VAS UNFIT. 
While there is no contention that plaintiff is unfit, 
there is no absolute right, as argued by her in her brief 
on appeal, of a divorced mother to have custody of her 
12 
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minor l'hildren 1nerely because there is no finding that 
she was an unfit parent. This has been the established 
law in Utah since the decision in Johnson v. Johnson, 
supra. and this court has recently handed down two 
decisions in accord with this view, Wilson et ux v. Pierce, 
suprn, and JlcBroom t'. McBroo'Tn, supra. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF HAS 'V AIVED ANY RIGHT 
TO THE CCSTODY OF HER MINOR CHILD . 
.~. \s has heretofore been shown, plaintiff has had the 
right, the opportunity and ability from the date of the 
original divorce decree to the date of the hearing to 
han· the child and for reasons of her own has failed 
and neglected to do so. It is respectfully contended 
that she has thereby waived any paramount right she 
may have, statutory or otherwise, to have custody of 
this l·hild as opposed to the right of her ex-husband, the 
defendant. Alley v. Alley, 72 Utah 196, 269 Pac. 487. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISINCLINATION 
TO A'YARD COUNSEL FEES TO THE 
PLAIXTIFF SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
ABSENT . ..-\. CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE 
COlTRT ABl'SED ITS DISCRETION . 
..-\ ,·ery comprehensive annotation dealing with 
this precise point Inay be found at 15 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1270 
13 
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at p. 1272. See also Scott v. Scott~ 105 Utah 376, Ht 
P. (2d) 198; Anderson v. Anderson~ 110 Utah 300, 17~ 
P. (2d) 132. 
POINT ·vii. 
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER ASSESS-
ING THE RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETER-
MINING 'V HE T HE R COUNSEL FEES 
SHOULD BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, 
CORRECTLY DECLINED TO MAKE SUCH 
AWARD. 
There is no contention or showing that the expen-
ditures for counsel fees made by plaintiff to resist de-
fendant's motion were made for the benefit of the minor 
child or should be properly classified as a necessary. 
15 A.L.R. (2d) 1282. Moreover, the record clearly 
shows that plaintiff is in a better relative financial posi-
tion to pay these expenses than is defendant. 15 A.L.R. 
1281. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found that the defendant 
and his present wife were better able to provide the love 
and attention which the minor child, Robert Leon Chase, 
required and that it was in the child's best interest and 
that it would serve to promote the welfare of the child 
if the custody were to be granted to the parent best able 
to provide such love and attention and, concluding that 
14 
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there was no overriding legal right possessed by plain-
tift'. accordingly granted said custody to the defendant. 
l I:n·ing granted custody to the defendant, there was 
uo longer any reason for the continuation of the re-
quirement that the defendant pay $60.00 per month 
child support to plaintiff and the trial court correctly 
terminated such obligation. 
At'ter taking into consideration the effect of the 
plaintifi''s action in resisting defendant's motion upon 
the welfare of said minor child, as well as the relative 
financial ability of the families to pay for said resist-
:mce, the trial court correctly declined to award plain-
tiff's attorney's fees for the hearing. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's 
order should be affirmed and that plaintiff should be 
required to pay her own attorney's fees on this appeal 
for the reasons stated in support of the denial of attor-
ney's fees in connection with the proceedings here ap-
pealed from. 
Respectfully sub1nitted this 12th day of September, 
1963. 
JAMES F. HOUSLEY 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
.. .-\ .. ttorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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